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... ,. • • -. IN THE UTAH COURT OF \IMM\ M,S 
I H h M Al l ' ( "I I ' l «"'.II : 
Plsnntill '^ipcH'1' 
v. : 
JOHN MICHAEL HASSELBLAU, i Case No. 20G20730-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTION AINI) NA I URL Oh THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction I'm hur^hiiy, n '.ivond ikifjvv 
felony, in violation, of Utah, Code Annotated sect ion 76-6-202 (1999), and from the 
i ira n™, s Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 
^icui Code i (|, Kt1 11 -<><) J!), which grants this I iuirt jurisdiction 
over cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1, 1 rial judges must instruct the jury on .r . . »i 
and lesser offense overlap and if a rational basis exists for acquitting the defendant nf -
ner offense and convicting on. the lesser crime. Appellant presen ~~~w diat he 
Wiis home wtini i Iniii'i.iiv m (liiicil it lew hlocks away but that the culprits of that crime 
gave him the property taken during the burglary a short time later. Did the trial judge err 
in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser related offense of receiving stolen property? 
Whether the trial judge should have instructed the jury on a lesser related offense 
is a question of law which this Court reviews for correctness. State v. Pavne. 964 P.2d 
327, 332 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Trial counsel requested the trial judge to give such an 
instruction, objected to the judge's decision not to give the instruction, and filed a motion 
for new trial challenging the judge's decision. R. 189; 196; 249: 91-99; 250B.1 This 
Court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991). 
2. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 ("Rule 19") allows trial judges to request 
parties to submit their proposed jury instructions at the final pretrial conference and 
authorizes parties to request additional jury instructions during trial. Here, Appellant 
requested a lesser related offense instruction several months before trial and renewed the 
request at the close of the evidence. Did the trial judge err in concluding that Appellant 
failed to request the lesser offense instruction in a timely manner or abuse his discretion 
!The volume marked 249 contains the trial transcript. Volume 250 contains both 
transcripts of the sentencing hearing and the hearing on the motion for a new trial. To 
distinguish between these two hearings, this brief will refer to the sentencing hearing as 
"R. 250A" and to the hearing on the motion for new trial as "R. 250B." The volume 
marked 252 contains three pretrial conferences held on July 11, 2001, August 27, 2001, 
and September 24, 2001. These hearings are referred to respectively as "R. 252A,"R. 
252B," and "R. 252C." The internal page numbers of all of these volumes will be 
included after "R." and the volume number. 
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in refusing to give 'the jury the i * ! -
1 lie ml ifi-i. Iiiliun of a court *~^
 Fi 
reviews for correctness. State v. Bvbee. 2000 UT 43,1|10, 1 P.3d 1087. Even if a p 
i I . >r a jury instruction, trial judges have discretion whether or not to 
give the ,. . v,
 w .>iate v. Evans, 668 P.2d 
566, 568 (Utah 1983). r >e1 annie< . -.- .action 
and that the trial judge had a titi) L ~„~„„ „ oh a k 
91-W. ... • 
STATUTES CITED IN THE BRIEF •• 
U loli Code Annotated subsections "76-6- v)'h h i i h , \ \ Mipp .''i'1 J 11:11 the 
prime and punishment for burglary: 
11) An actor is guilty ,T burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent 
to commit: 
I i l l Jii h ' l o i r r\ - •• , • • • • 
(b) theft; 
(c) an assault on. any person; 
.vdness, a violation of Subsection 76-9-702( 1); 
subsection 76-9-702(3); or 
(f) lewdness niv 
702.5. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was 
committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the 
second degree. 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-6-408 (1999) defines the related crime of 
receiving stolen property in relevant part: 
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of 
the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the 
property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is 
presumed in the case of an actor who: 
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on 
a separate occasion; 
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding 
the receiving offense charged; 
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or 
disposed, acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far 
below its reasonable value[.] 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 26, 2000, the state charged Appellant John Michael Hasselblad with 
burglary of a home. R. 3. At a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound over John on 
the charge. R. 40-42, 72. The trial court conducted a jury trial on October 4, 2001. R. 
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249. At the conclusion of the evidence, defense counsel requested the trial judge to 
instruct the jury on the lesser related offense of receiving stolen property. R. 249: 91. 
The trial judge denied the motion concluding that counsel should have submitted the 
instruction before trial or, at least, before the lunch recess. R. 249: 99. 
The trial judge sentenced John on February 4, 2002. R. 186; Addendum A.2 The 
judge imposed a sentence of one to 15 years but suspended the sentence and ordered John 
to serve 365 days in jail. R. 250A: 2. The trial judge also placed John on 36 months 
probations and allowed him to be released from jail early to a drug treatment program 
once a bed became available. R. 250A: 2. 
On February 14, 2002, John filed a motion for new trial. R. 189. He argued that 
he had requested the lesser offense instruction in a timely manner and that the evidence 
supported his defense theory that he did not participate in the burglary, but, merely 
possessed stolen property. R. 190; 196-199. The State opposed the motion. R. 215. The 
trial judge held a hearing and ruled that the lesser offense was not related to burglary, did 
not apply to the facts presented at trial, was not a correct statement of the law, and that 
defense counsel had made an untimely request for the jury instruction. R. 250B: 15-18. 
The trial judge entered a written order denying the motion on August 8, 2002. R. 228. 
John filed a timely notice of appeal on September 3, 2002. R. 229. 
2Volume 250 lists an incorrect date for the sentencing hearing. The correct date is 
listed in the record on appeal at page 186. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At about 3:30 or 4:00 p.m. on the afternoon of August 14, 2000, Candida 
Rodriguez and her husband were arguing in the street in front of their home in Magna. R. 
249: 10-11. During the argument, Ms. Rodriguez noticed a group of four or five 
teenagers walking past. R. 249: 12. The group consisted of both males and females. R. 
249: 12. Ms. Rodriguez looked directly at one of the girls who also made eye contact and 
seemed to understand that an argument was occurring. R. 249: 12-13. This girl was also 
wearing a distinctive red blouse and a black skirt with roses on it. R. 249: 12. Ms. 
Rodriguez did not observe any of the other teenagers. R. 249: 12-13. 
The argument soon ended and Ms. Rodriguez went inside her house while her 
husband apparently left on foot. R. 249: 13. Ms. Rodriguez retrieved her car keys, got 
her daughter, and drove away in her car. R. 249: 13. When she left the house, she failed 
to completely close the front door. R. 249: 14. If not closed properly, Ms. Rodriguez's 
front door will remain open. R. 249: 14. As she drove away, the group of teenagers were 
walking slowly down the street. R. 249: 14. 
Ms. Rodriguez returned home about 15 minutes later. R. 249: 14-15. As she 
approached her home, some neighbors met her in front of the house and informed her that 
they had called the police because they saw someone entering her home. R. 249: 15. Ms. 
Rodriguez saw that her front door had been left open with no sign of a forced entry. R. 
249: 16. When she went inside, she saw that a portable stereo was missing and her VCR 
6 
had been ripped from its electrical connections and taken away. R. 249: 16. 
When the police arrived, Ms. Rodriguez gave Deputy Todd Sisneros the 
manufacturer's paperwork for the portable stereo and VCR which included the serial 
numbers for each item. R. 249: 17-18. Ms. Rodriguez also described to Deputy Sisneros 
the group of teenagers that she saw before driving away, including the female who wore 
the red blouse and black skirt. R. 249: 57. 
At about 8:00 p.m., Deputy Sisneros overheard a radio report about an 
ungovernable juvenile. R. 249: 58. He responded to the call and upon arrival saw 15-
year old Cherie Simpson sitting in the back of a patrol car.3 R. 249: 31, 59. Cherie's 
clothes matched Ms. Rodriguez's description of the girl with the red blouse and black 
skirt. R. 249: 59. Deputy Sisneros transported Cherie to Ms. Rodriguez's home for a 
show-up identification. R. 249: 59. Ms. Rodriguez identified Cherie as the girl she had 
seen with the red blouse and black skirt. R. 249: 59. 
Deputy Sisneros then interrogated Cherie about her involvement in the theft of the 
portable stereo and VCR. R. 249: 59. Cherie denied stealing the property but stated that 
she knew who did, naming Appellant, 18-year old John Michael Hasselblad. R. 249: 59-
60. Cherie did not name any other friends who were in the group near Ms. Rodriguez's 
home nor did she provide any other information about her whereabouts after the theft. R. 
3The record on appeal includes various spellings for Cherie Simpson's first name. 
The correct spelling is included in the preliminary hearing transcript. R. 62. 
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249: 65. Cherie stated that Deputy Sisneros could find the stolen items at John's home. 
R. 249: 68. Deputy Sisneros stated that Cherie volunteered this information and that he 
had given her no inducements in exchange for her cooperation. R. 249: 60. 
Deputy Sisneros went to John's home and met John's father at the door. R. 249: 
60-61. The father stated that John was not home but he granted Deputy Sisneros 
permission to search John's bedroom. R. 249: 61. Deputy Sisneros found Ms. 
Rodriguez's portable stereo and VCR between the bed and the wall hidden under some 
blankets. R. 249: 62-63. He then returned the items to Ms. Rodriguez. R. 249: 20. 
Later that evening, John's father called the police and notified them that John had 
returned home. R. 249: 63. At about 10:00 p.m., Deputy Sisneros went to the residence 
and arrested John. R. 249: 63-64. John waived his Miranda rights and explained that an 
unidentified person had brought the portable stereo and VCR to his house earlier in the 
evening and asked him to repair the VCR. R. 249: 64. John refused to identify the 
person who brought him the stolen items. R. 249: 66. 
The State filed a criminal Information charging John with burglary. R. 3. At the 
preliminary hearing on the charge, Ms. Rodriguez identified Cherie as the female she saw 
outside her house just before the burglary. R. 49. She did not recognize John as being 
one of the other youths at the scene. R. 51. 
Before calling Cherie to testify, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Cherie 
had not been charged with any offenses connected to the burglary and that the State had 
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agreed not to prosecute her for any of her actions related to this case. R. 63-64. The 
prosecutor indicated that he was satisfied that Cherie had been referred to juvenile court 
for other unrelated charges. R. 63. 
Cherie asserted that John actually stole the portable stereo and VCR from the 
house, but that her friend April Meade entered the house while April's brother David 
Meade waited outside. R. 67-68, 71; R. 249: 33. April was John's former girlfriend. R. 
69. This was the first time Cherie had ever mentioned the names of the other 
accomplices. R. 249: 48. Cherie also offered conflicting testimony over whether she 
entered the house with John and April. R. 67-68, 71. Cherie denied ever going to John's 
house on the day of the burglary. R. 71. The trial court found probable cause to bind the 
case over for trial. R. 72. 
The trial judge originally scheduled a pretrial conference for July 9, 2001, and a 
two-day jury trial beginning July 11, 2001. R. 91. On the day of the pretrial conference, 
the prosecutor filed his proposed jury voir dire questions and jury instructions with the 
trial court. R. 96. The record contains no indication that the pretrial conference was held 
on the scheduled date. Also included in the record is one defense instruction on the lesser 
related offense of receiving stolen property. R. 116. Chronologically, this instruction is 
placed in record after the filing of the State's proposed instructions on July 9, 2001, and 
before the scheduled jury trial on July 11, 2001. R. 116. 
On the date scheduled for trial, the trial judge continued the trial because of a 
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higher priority case. R. 117-18; 252A. The trial judge then held a pretrial conference on 
August 27, 2001. R. 252B. Due to other conflicts, the trial judge rescheduled the trial for 
October. R. 252B: 2. In doing so, he informed counsel that, "I've already got your jury 
instructions and requested voir dire." R. 252B: 2. 
On September 6, 2001, the prosecutor requested the trial judge for a material 
witness warrant to arrest Cherie. R. 130. The prosecutor avowed that Cherie failed to 
comply with subpoenas to appear at a prior trial date and at the district attorney's offices, 
she expressed to several people her unwillingness to testify, and that she had received 
unspecified threats if she did testify. R. 132. The trial judge granted the request and 
incarcerated Cherie in the Salt Lake Juvenile Detention Center pending her testimony in 
John's trial. R. 129. 
A month later, the trial court convened a jury trial on October 4, 2001. R. 249. 
Ms. Rodriguez repeated at trial the details of the thefts. R. 249: 10-30. She added that 
the portable stereo was about a year old and she had purchased it for about $200. R. 249: 
17-18. The stereo was not damaged but the police never found the attached remote 
control that allowed her to program certain preferences. R. 249: 18. Ms. Rodriquez 
purchased the VCR a month before the crime for $200. R. 249: 17. 
Cherie testified while still incarcerated under the material witness warrant. R. 249: 
50. During her trial testimony, she related several new details for the first time. She 
stated that she approached Ms. Rodriguez's open door because she became "concerned11 
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that someone had left the door open and so she went to close it. R. 249: 33-35. Cherie 
first entered the house to check to see if anyone was home. R. 249: 34. According to 
Cherie, she simply wanted "to make sure the door would get closed so nothing would 
happen. .. ." R. 249: 34. 
April followed Cherie into the house. R. 249: 34. Cherie testified that when April 
saw the portable stereo, she yelled to John to come and take it. R. 249: 34. Cherie 
claimed that John entered the house and took the stereo, R. 249: 34. 
Cherie further alleged for the first time that the four teenagers ran to John's sister's 
house which was two or three blocks away. R. 249: 36-37, 76. The group dropped off 
the portable stereo and then returned to Ms. Rodriguez's home 20 minutes later. R. 249: 
34, 37. Cherie continued that the teens entered the home again and John ripped the VCR 
out of its hook-ups, breaking some of the wiring. R. 249: 37. The four teens then 
returned to John's sister's house with the VCR. R. 249: 37. 
Cherie asserted further that when Ms. Rodriguez made eye contact with her Cherie 
was not wearing the red blouse and black skirt that Ms. Rodriguez had seen. R. 249: 37-
38. Rather, she claimed that after the thefts, she went home and changed her clothes. R. 
249: 37. After doing so, she went to April's house where Deputy Sisneros apprehended 
her. R. 249: 38-39. Deputy Sisneros then presented Cherie to Ms. Rodriguez for a show-
up identification. R. 249: 38-39. Ms. Rodriguez identified Cherie as "the juvenile 
female with the red top and the black bottom." R. 249: 38-39, 59. Contrary to Cherie's 
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preliminary hearing testimony, Deputy Sisneros' report of Cherie's statements, and 
Deputy Sisneros' own recollection, Cherie claimed that she gave Deputy Sisneros the 
other three teenagers' names. R. 249: 39. 
Cherie last saw the stereo and VCR at John's sister's house. R. 249: 40. She 
denied ever going to John's house that day. R. 249: 41. John lived five or six blocks 
from the scene of the crime. R. 249: 75. Cherie did not remember April or David Meade 
going over to John's house either and she claimed that she spent "a long time" with the 
Meades at their house. R. 249: 41. 
Cherie claimed that she willingly spoke with Deputy Sisneros without expectation 
of promises. R. 249: 39. But, she admitted that both her mother and the prosecutor told 
her that she would not be prosecuted for the thefts if she testified against John. R. 249: 
39-40. Cherie also conceded that since the thefts, she was no longer friends with John 
because she "didn't want to talk him anymore and I still don't." R. 249: 40. 
Following Cherie's direct testimony, the trial judge recessed the proceedings for 
the lunch break. R. 249: 42. After excusing the jury, the trial judge stated that if the trial 
testimony were to be completed that day, "we'd have to spend some time on jury 
instructions at some point [] since [defense counsel]. . . [was] not available over the noon 
hour...." R. 249: 42. Defense counsel was scheduled to teach a class over the lunch 
break. R. 249: 42-43. Defense counsel offered to "take a look at the instructions" at some 
unspecified time. R. 249: 43. The trial judge then stated that because the jury 
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instructions did not appear to be too complicated he would compile them over the noon 
hour after which the parties would discuss the instructions: 
I don't think we should need a lot of discussion. What 
I'll do is go ahead and put them together the way I propose to 
give them over the noon hour and those will be sitting on your 
desk when you get back and if you could find a moment to take 
a quick look at them and maybe just on the break we could have 
a discussion about that. 
R. 249: 43. 
Following the lunch break, the trial judge immediately resumed the proceedings 
and invited defense counsel to cross-examine Cherie. R. 249: 44. Cherie contradicted 
much of her direct testimony and her prior statements. Contrary to her direct testimony, 
Cherie wasn't sure if she provided Deputy Sisneros April's and David's names. R. 249: 
47-48, 65. She also claimed, contrary to her statements to the police and her preliminary 
hearing testimony, that she informed Deputy Sisneros that she only went to the house to 
check on the house and to shut the door. R. 249: 48. 
Likewise, she denied her preliminary hearing testimony that April entered the 
house with her. R. 249: 48-49. Cherie further claimed that she pointed out John's sister's 
house to the police and that she accompanied the police to the house but the sister was not 
home. R. 249: 49. Deputy Sisneros denied ever receiving any information from Cherie 
about John's sister or going to that house. R. 249: 49, 65-66. In fact, the police never 
contacted any other witnesses, including April, David, or John's sister. R. 249: 66. 
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Cherie admitted that after April and John had broken up, she remained friends with 
April and David. R. 249: 48. At the time of her arrest, Cherie was serving probation in 
the juvenile court system. R. 249: 50-51. She conceded further that once she was 
finished testifying she would be released from detention on the material witness warrant. 
R. 249: 50. 
After Cherie's testimony, the State rested and the defense called John's father, 
Raymond Hasselblad, ("Mr. Hasselblad") to testify. R. 249: 68-69. Mr. Hasselblad 
testified that on the day of the burglary John was home with him at 3:00 or 3:30 p.m. and 
had been home an hour prior to that time. R. 249: 11, 70-74. About this time, Mr. 
Hasselblad was taking an afternoon nap when he heard the dog barking because someone 
had knocked on the door. R. 249: 73-74. When he got up from bed, he saw John walking 
down the hallway carrying something. R. 249: 70. Mr. Hasselbald asked John what he 
was carrying and John replied that he had received a portable stereo and a VCR from 
"three kids." R. 249: 70. Mr. Hasselblad wondered where John had obtained the 
electronic equipment because John had no means of purchasing such expensive items. R. 
249: 72-73. When asked about the three people, John didn't answer and went into his 
bedroom. R. 249: 70. 
Mr. Hasselblad then looked out the window and saw one male and two female 
teenagers outside the home. R. 249: 70, 75. He recognized one of the females as John's 
former girlfriend April. R. 249: 70, 75. After John placed the electronic equipment in his 
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bedroom, he left the house. R. 249: 74. 
John testified that on the day in question he was home from 11:00 a.m. until 4:00 
p.m. when Cherie, April, and David knocked on the door. R. 249: 78-79, 81. He 
reiterated his contention that the three teens had brought him the VCR to repair. R. 249: 
78. John repairs electronic equipment as a hobby. R. 249: 78. Without explanation, the 
three asked him to keep the portable stereo with the VCR even though it was not broken. 
R. 249: 83. He did not ask why they wanted him to keep the stereo, whether they planned 
to pay him, or where they obtained the electronic equipment. R. 249: 83-85. 
After hiding the equipment in his bedroom, John left the house at 4:30 p.m. to visit 
a friend. R. 249: 79, 82. He denied ever going past Ms. Rodriguez's home or visiting his 
sister's house that day. R. 249: 81-82. While he was walking through town, John learned 
that the police were looking for him. R. 249: 79. Upon receiving this information, John 
hurried home where his father told him that the police had come and taken the electronic 
equipment. R. 249: 79. John remained at his home while his father called the police. R. 
249: 79-80. 
When Deputy Sisneros arrived, John explained that some friends had given him 
the electronic equipment to repair. R. 249: 80. He did not identify his friends because he 
"didn't want to get anybody involved in trouble." R. 249: 80. Specifically, he deduced 
from Deputy Sisneros' questions that the portable stereo and VCR had been stolen. R. 
249: 80. 
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After the defense rested, the prosecutor recalled Cherie to testify in rebuttal. R. 
249: 87. She maintained that she had gone to John's sister's house with a police officer 
whom she believed to be Deputy Sisneros. R. 249:88. She similarly reasserted that John 
had taken the electronic equipment and that it was stored at John's sister's house. R. 249: 
89. The prosecutor then concluded his case. R. 249: 90. 
After dismissing the jury, the trial judge revisited the issue of jury instructions. R. 
249: 91. The prosecutor objected to defense counsel's proposed instruction on the lesser 
related offense of receiving stolen property that defense counsel had submitted several 
months before trial. R. 116-18; 249: 91. Defense counsel argued that the instruction was 
proper because the jury could conclude from the evidence that although John had not 
participated in the burglary, he had knowingly or recklessly taken possession of stolen 
property. R. 249: 92. 
The trial judge became upset with defense counsel for presenting the instruction 
"at the end of the noon hour." R. 249: 92. According to the trial judge, he had ordered 
any instructions to be presented "at the time of the pre-trial conference [or] . . . at the 
beginning of the noon hour." R. 249: 92. He blamed defense counsel for not submitting 
the instruction earlier because he prefers to deliberate about lesser offense instructions 
beforehand rather than on the "spur of the moment." R. 249: 95. 
Defense counsel apologized for not providing the instruction sooner. R. 249: 93-
94. But, counsel maintained that although he had prepared the instruction he did not 
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know until after the presentation of all of the evidence and after consulting with his client 
whether even to request a lesser offense instruction. R. 249: 94-95. As a strategic matter, 
defense counsel argued that he had no duty to inform the prosecutor of the defense theory 
and that often times the defense theory does not become evident until after all of the 
evidence is presented. R. 249: 98. For these very reasons, defense counsel believed that 
he could submit a jury instruction on lesser offenses at the conclusion of the evidence. R. 
249: 98. The trial judge "strongly" opposed defense counsel's reasoning because counsel 
knew the defense theory before trial and, thus, he was not surprised by the evidence. R. 
249: 98-99. 
The trial judge rejected the instruction because he concluded that defense counsel 
had "disregarded] my order to have your jury instructions in by a certain time." R. 249: 
92, 98. In doing so, the trial judge took into consideration the prosecutor's complaint that 
the State had no opportunity to prove the value of the items taken for purposes of 
determining the degree of the offense for receiving stolen property. R. 249: 96-97; see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1999) (listing punishments for theft crimes based on 
value of property taken). The trial judge concluded further that receiving stolen property 
was not a lesser included offense to burglary as a matter of law. R. 249: 93-94. Lastly, 
he ruled that because John did not testify about whether he knew the electronic equipment 
to be stolen when he received it, there was no rational basis for the jury to acquit him of 
burglary and convict him of receiving stolen property. R. 249: 94. 
17 
The jury convicted Mr. Hasselblad of burglary. R. 249: 124. On February 4, 
2002, the trial judge sentenced John to a term of one to 15 years but suspended the 
sentence and ordered John to serve 365 days in jail. R. 250A: 2. The trial judge also 
placed John on 36 months probations and allowed him to be released from jail early to 
Odyssey House once a bed became available. R. 250A: 2. 
On February 14, 2002, John filed a motion for new trial. R. 189. He contended 
that the trial judge must instruct the jury on a ,u lesser included or a related offense [] 
where there is some rational basis in the evidence on which the jury could find as the 
defendant requests.'" R. 198 (quoting State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) 
(emphasis added in motion)). John argued that he was entitled to the instruction because 
he presented evidence that he was at home at the time of the burglary and Cherie was an 
unreliable witness. R. 198-99. 
The State opposed the motion based on the reasons the trial judge offered at trial. 
R. 215-221. It also claimed that the offered instruction was an inaccurate statement of the 
law. R. 221-223. 
The trial judge held a hearing on the motion. R. 250B. Defense counsel explained 
that he had no intention to disobey the court when he submitted the lesser related offense 
instruction. R. 250B: 1-2. Rather, the judge's decision to submit jury instructions caught 
him off guard because it had been his experience during the 10 years he had practiced law 
that even if the trial judge sets a deadline for submitting jury instructions, issues such as 
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lesser offenses arise during trial that require further discussions over the instructions. R. 
250B: 2. Defense counsel argued further that the jury could have rationally convicted 
John of receiving stolen property instruction because: (1) Mr. Hasselblad corroborated 
John's claims that he was home at the time of the burglary and that a male and two female 
teenagers, including April, delivered the electronic equipment to John's home; (2) John 
hid the equipment behind his bed; and, (3) John gave an incomplete and unpersuasive 
explanation to the police about repairing the VCR and storing the stereo. R. 250B: 3-5. 
Finally defense counsel asserted that the crimes of burglary and receiving stolen property 
were related because both charges were premised on the theft of the electronic equipment. 
R.250B:at6-9. 
Although the trial judge did not specifically remember the events at trial, he stated 
that in a one-day trial he would have only finalized jury instructions on his own once both 
parties had stated that they had no objections to the instructions or after conferencing with 
both parties after the lunch break. R. 250B: 13-17. Because the trial judge specifically 
remembered finalizing the instructions, he concluded that defense counsel must have 
represented that he had no objections or the judge had conducted a conference. R. 250B: 
16. Further, he stated that although he allows for additional instructions when a party is 
surprised by the evidence, no surprise occurred in this case. R. 250B: 16. 
The trial judge stated further that even if there was no jury instruction conference 
or the parties had not consented to the instructions, he would have rejected the instruction 
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based on the same grounds he relied on at trial. R. 250B: 17-18. The trial judge 
subsequently entered a written order denying the motion. R. 228. This appeal followed. 
R. 229. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trial judges must instruct the jury on lesser offenses whenever two offenses 
overlap and any evidence at all supports acquitting the defendant of the greater offense 
and convicting on the lesser. Here, the crimes of burglary and receiving stolen property 
overlapped because the burglary was premised on an intent to commit theft and the crime 
of receiving stolen property is a theft offense that requires the same intent of seeking to 
deprive an owner of possession of property. Further, John presented evidence that he was 
at home during the burglary and that Cherie, April, and David delivered the stolen items 
to him. The evidence also showed that John knew or probably should have known that 
the items were stolen because he made no arrangements for payment to repair the VCR or 
to return the goods, he hid the items in his bedroom, and his reactions upon learning that 
the police were looking for him supported his guilty knowledge. Given the strength of 
this evidence supporting the defense theory, the trial judge plainly erred in rejecting the 
requested instruction. Reversal is required to afford John his right to instruct the jury on 
his theory of the case. 
The trial judge erroneously concluded that defense counsel submitted a late request 
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to instruct the jury on a lesser offense at the close of the evidence. In the first place, the 
trial judge erred because defense counsel submitted the request several months before 
trial. Moreover, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 allows parties to submit additional 
jury instructions during trial. Because the trial judge set no deadlines for filing new 
instructions during trial and, in fact, represented that the parties would finalize the 
instructions after the lunch break, defense counsel properly submitted his request for a 
lesser offense instruction at the close of the evidence. 
Even if the trial judge had set a firm deadline for submitting jury instructions 
during trial, he abused his discretion in rejecting defense counsel's request. Defense 
counsel specifically followed Rule 19, had a good-faith belief that he was following 
accepted court practice, and reasonably relied on the law on lesser offense instructions. 
Moreover, the trial judge's misapplication of that law constituted a further abuse of 
discretion. The cases that have found requests for jury instructions to be late do not apply 
here because defense counsel specifically preserved his challenge to the judge's decision 
by giving the trial judge several opportunities to correct his errors. Further, those cases 
involved delinquent counsel, whereas, here, defense counsel acted in good faith and 
reasonably relied on the trial judge's representations in waiting to submit his request. In 
any event, because the evidence supported the lesser offense instruction, the trial judge 
plainly erred and committed a manifest injustice in rejecting the requested instruction. 
21 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL JUDGE'S ERRONEOUS REFUSAL TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON A LESSER RELATED 
OFFENSE DEPRIVED MR. HASSELBLAD OF HIS 
RIGHT TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON HIS THEORY OF 
THE CASE 
The evidence presented at trial supported Mr. Hasselblad's defense theory that he 
was at home during the burglary but that he knowingly or recklessly took possession of 
stolen property. In denying John's requested jury instruction, the trial judge rigorously 
viewed the evidence when the law on lesser offenses requires judges to instruct the jury 
on lesser offenses whenever any evidence supports the defense theory. Because the facts 
supported acquitting John of burglary and convicting him of receiving stolen property, the 
trial judge erred in refusing to give the lesser offense instruction. 
To instruct the jury on lesser offenses, criminal defendants need only present a 
minimal quantum of evidence to support the lesser charge. Freely instructing juries on 
lesser offenses at the defendant's request "gives the defendant the benefit of the 
reasonable doubt standard." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157 (Utah 1983). Specifically, 
when the evidence is in dispute about an element of an offense, instructing the jury on a 
lesser offense avoids placing the jury in the all-or-nothing dilemma of choosing between 
acquittal and convicting of a more serious offense than the defendant deserves. IdL This 
approach "serves a fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of 
any offense that fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the 
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prosecutor chooses to file and an acquittal." State v. Hansen. 734 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 
1986). To avoid such unfair situations, trial judges should "liberally construe[]" the 
requirements for a defendant's request for a lesser offense. Id; see also State v. Carruth, 
1999 UT 107, 993 P.2d 869 (reaffirming principles discussed above). 
The trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury below on receiving stolen 
property. When the defendant requests a lesser offense instruction, the trial judge "must" 
give the instruction when: (i) the two "offenses overlap to some degree, and (ii) the 
evidence provides a 'rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense 
charged and convicting him5" or her of the lesser offense. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424 
(quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159) (emphasis added) (internal quotation omitted)). The 
facts of this case establish both of these requirements. 
First, the crimes of burglary and receiving stolen property overlapped. Two 
offenses overlap "when there is 'some relationship' between them and 'some overlap' in 
the proof [is] required to establish the elements of both offenses." State v. Pitts, 728 P.2d 
113, 116 (Utah 1986). A person commits the crime of burglary by entering or remaining 
in a building with the intent to commit a felony or some other enumerated crime. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202(1) (Supp. 2002). Here, the State specifically charged Mr. 
Hasselblad with committing burglary by entering a dwelling "with the intent to commit a 
theft." R. 3. Further, the State's theory of the case as outlined in the jury instructions 
relied exclusively on Mr. Hasselblad entering or remaining in a dwelling "with the intent 
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to commit a theft" R. 148. 
This theory directly overlaps with the crime of receiving stolen property. That 
offense is included in Title 76, chapter 6, part 4 which defines the various forms of 
"Theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1999). In defining the receipt of stolen property, 
the legislature specifically designated that crime as a "theft" offense by imputing criminal 
responsibility whenever a person takes property knowing or believing that property 
probably has been stolen: 
A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes 
of the property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or 
believing that it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, sells, 
withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or withholding the 
property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, 
intending to deprive the owner of it. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1999) (emphasis added). Utah law defines theft as taking 
property "with a purpose to deprive" the owner of it. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999). 
Burglary and receiving stolen property overlapped in this case because the theories 
behind both crimes were premised on an intent to commit a theft. To overlap, the 
offenses need not share "a necessary element." Pitts. 728 P.2d at 116. Rather the 
elements need only "overlap at all" in light of the facts presented at trial. Hansen. 734 
P.2d at 424. In Pitts, for example, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that although a person 
may commit burglary by having the intent to commit crimes other than theft, the crimes 
of burglary and theft overlapped because the facts of that case rested on the theft of a 
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bank deposit envelope. 728 P.2d at 114, 116. Likewise, here, the facts allege an intent to 
deprive a person of a portable stereo and a VCR. Because both burglary and receiving 
stolen property rest on "a purpose to deprive" an owner of property, the crimes overlap 
for purposes of determining lesser offenses. IdL at 116; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1999). 
Second, the evidence presented below established "a rational basis" for acquitting 
John on burglary and convicting him of receiving stolen property. Baker, 671 P.2d at 159 
(internal quotation omitted). Criminal defendants are entitled to instruct the jury on their 
theory of the case, including "'lesser offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence 
would support'" conviction for the lesser offense. Carrutk 1999 UT 107, f6, 993 P.2d 
869 (quoting State v. Gillian. 463 P.2d 811, 812 (Utah 1970)). Thus, "when the evidence 
is ambiguous and therefore susceptible to alternative interpretations," trial judges must 
give lesser offense instructions. Baker. 671 P.2d at 159. Even "slight" evidence is 
sufficient to require a jury instruction. State v. Chesnut 621 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Utah 
1980). In determining whether a rational basis exists, trial courts "must 'view the 
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
defense/" Kruger. 2000 UT 60,1fl4, 6 P.3d 1116. 
John presented more than "a sufficient quantum of evidence [] to justify sending 
the question to the jury." Baker. 671 P.2d at 159. Both John and his father testified that 
John was home at the time of the burglary. R. 249: 10-11, 70-72, 81. John's father 
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testified that someone rang the doorbell about the same time the burglary occurred. R. 
249: 70-75. He then saw John carting a portable stereo and a VCR to his bedroom. 
When asked, John refused to disclose who had given him the electronic equipment. R. 
249: 70. Accordingly, John's father looked out the window and saw April, another 
female teenager, and a male teenager walking away from the house. R. 249: 74-75. 
Thus, John presented evidence that he was at home when the crime occurred and 
could not have committed burglary. He supported his testimony that "three kids," 
including April, delivered the electronic equipment to him and that he never entered the 
crime scene. R. 249: 70. The gender and age of these three persons corresponds directly 
to John's claims that Cherie, April, and David brought the equipment to him. 
The remaining evidence is consistent with John's innocence on the burglary 
charge. In particular, Ms. Rodriguez could not identify John as being present with Cherie 
and the other teenagers that she saw near her home. R. 249: 23, 26. 
Moreover, Cherie had "strong motivations" to minimize her involvement and to 
point a finger at others. Lee v. Illinois. 476 U.S. 530 541 (1986). Most prominently, 
Cherie was forced to testify against John to gain her release from the material witness 
warrant. She was also serving probation at the time of her arrest and was given immunity 
from prosecution for her involvement in this matter. R. 249: 39-40, 50-51, 63-64. She 
even admitted that she understood she had received favors in exchange for her testimony. 
R. 249: 39-40. Cherie also had bad feelings toward John because she was John's former 
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girlfriend's best friend. R. 249: 40. She even admitted that she did not like John. R. 249: 
40. These personal motivations gave Cherie tremendous incentive "to curry favor with 
the authorities" by accusing others of criminal activity and informing for the police. 
State v. Drawn. 791 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Cherie's contradictory testimony further destroyed her credibility. In her 
statements to Deputy Sisneros and contrary to her trial testimony, Cherie never claimed 
that she: (1) was merely acting as a Good Samaritan in checking the open door; (2) 
identified April and David for the police; (3) informed the police about her whereabouts 
after the burglary, including going to John's sister's house, returning to the scene of the 
burglary, and then going back to the sister's house; or, (4) went to the sister's house with 
the police and knocked on the door. R. 249: 33-39, 47-49, 65-66. In fact, she falsely 
claimed at trial that she testified to many of these same facts at the preliminary hearing. 
R. 249: 48. Cherie even maintained her false testimony during rebuttal and insisted, 
contrary to Deputy Sisneros' testimony, that she had accompanied the police to the 
sister's house. R. 249: 88. 
Even more telling, Cherie claimed on the day of her arrest that the police could 
find the electronic equipment at John's house while at trial she claimed she last saw the 
stolen items at John's sister's house. R. 71; 249: 40, 68. Not only would Cherie's 
memory have been more accurate on the day of her arrest, but her claim that the 
equipment was at John's home was consistent with John's story that he received the 
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equipment from Cherie, April, and David at his home. 
Numerous other contradictions marred Cherie's testimony. Cherie repeatedly 
contradicted herself about who entered the home. R. 67-68, 71; 249: 33-34, 48-49. She 
likewise lied about changing her clothes. Specifically, Ms. Rodriquez and Deputy 
Sisneros testified that Ms. Rodriquez identified Cherie as wearing the same clothes during 
the burglary as she was wearing at the show-up identification. R. 249: 37-39, 59. 
Moreover, Cherie gave no explanation for the police failure to investigate the information 
that she claimed she provided the police about John's sister's house and the identity of 
her accomplices. R. 249: 66. Given Cherie's lack of credibility, her testimony served as 
no support for convicting John of burglary. 
The evidence not only established innocence on burglary but also reasonably 
supported that John received stolen property "knowing that it ha[d] been stolen, or 
believing that it probably ha[d] been stolen." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1999). 
When John accepted the VCR for repair, he asked no questions or made any 
arrangements for payment or pick-up. R. 249: 83. Further, he curiously took possession 
of the portable stereo even though it was not broken. R. 249: 83. From these facts, a 
person could reasonably infer that John either knew the items were stolen or he probably 
believed them to be stolen. 
John's hiding of the stereo and VCR hidden under a blanket behind his bed 
bolsters this inference. R. 249: 62-63. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999). If John 
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believed that the people who gave him the equipment legitimately possessed it, he would 
have had no reason to hide the stereo and VCR behind his bed. John's lack of money is 
further consistent with a willingness to repair a stolen VCR without asking any questions 
either to earn money, keep possession of the equipment himself, or sell it to another. 
John's reactions upon his learning that the police were looking for him are further 
consistent with a knowledge or belief that he had taken stolen property. Immediately 
upon learning that the police were looking for him, he returned home and consented to his 
father calling the police. R. 249: 80. He then waited for the police to arrive to question 
him. But, when interrogated by the police, John refused to identify the persons who had 
given him the electronic equipment because he did not want to get them into trouble. R. 
249: 64-66, 80. He also admitted at trial that he knew when the police questioned him 
that the items had been stolen. R. 249: 80. These facts demonstrate that when John 
accepted the VCR and portable stereo he knew that the equipment was stolen and that his 
friends had taken it. 
The prosecutor argued below that the trial judge should have rejected the requested 
instruction because it failed to accurately state the law. R. 222, 249: 97-98, 250B: 12. 
The prosecutor argued that the instruction failed to specify a value for the property taken 
and that it improperly required the State to prove that John had "unlawfully and 
intentionally11 received the property. R. 222. To the contrary, the requested instruction 
correctly stated the mental state required by providing for a conviction if John received 
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the property "knowing that it had been stolen, or believing that it probably had been 
stolen" and that John "[i]ntended to deprive the owner of the property." R. 116. Even 
assuming that the use of the words "unlawfully and intentionally" were unnecessary, the 
instruction did not misstate the elements of the crime. Further, even if these words were 
unnecessary or the value of the property was a necessary element, the trial judge could 
have easily asked defense counsel to amend the instruction or the parties could have 
agreed upon the proper language during a jury instruction conference. 
Regardless of the correctness of the instruction, because the crimes of burglary and 
receiving stolen property overlapped and the evidence supported John's defense theory, 
the trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser related offense. Baker. 
671 P.2d at 159. John was, thus, entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the 
case. Id Reversal is required to ensure that John receives the full benefit of his right to 
require the State to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. IcL at 156-57. 
II. DEFENSE COUNSEL TIMELY REQUESTED AND 
PROPERLY PRESERVED THE LESSER OFFENSE 
INSTRUCTION 
The trial judge erroneously concluded that defense counsel submitted a late request 
to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of receiving stolen property. Defense 
counsel presented the requested instruction several months before trial. In any event, the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically allowed defense counsel to request the 
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instruction at the close of the evidence. Further, defense counsel relied on the trial 
judge's representation that he would hold a conference on jury instructions at the close of 
the evidence before finalizing the instructions. Even if defense counsel had delayed in 
requesting the instruction, the trial judge abused his discretion and committed a manifest 
injustice in refusing to instruct the jury on John's theory of the case. 
A. Appellant Filed a Timely Request For a Lesser 
Offense Instruction and He Made His Request 
Based on Good Faith, the Prevailing Practice 
in the District Court and in Reliance on The 
Trial Judge's Own Representations 
The trial judge committed numerous mistakes in ruling that defense counsel failed 
to timely submit the lesser offense instruction. As the record reveals, defense counsel 
followed Rule of Criminal Procedure 19 ("Rule 19") in requesting the instruction at a 
pretrial conference and renewing this request at the close of the evidence. That rule 
allows parties to request additional jury instructions during trial even if the trial judge has 
requested the parties to submit proposed instructions at an earlier time. 
Both defense counsel and the trial judge appeared to have mistakenly assumed that 
defense counsel did not submit the lesser offense instruction until the middle of trial. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(a) allows parties to submit proposed jury instructions 
"[a]t the final pretrial conference or at such other time as the court directs...." Here, the 
record indicates that defense counsel submitted the proposed instruction at the first 
31 
pretrial conference in July 2001, three months before the October 4, 2001 trial. R. 116. 
Specifically, in preparing the record on appeal, the trial court clerk placed the proposed 
instruction between the State's proposed instructions and jury voir dire questions which 
were filed on July 9, 2001, and the minute entry noting the postponement of the original 
trial date on July 10, 2001. R. 96-117. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 instructs the 
trial court clerk to place all trial documents in "chronological order." Utah R. App. P. 
11(b)(1)(D). At the pretrial conference in August 2001, the trial judge appeared to 
concede that defense counsel had submitted the instruction, when addressing the attorneys 
he stated that he "already [had] your jury instructions and requested voir dire." R. 252B: 
2. Thus, defense counsel complied with Rule of Criminal Procedure 19(a) and 
presumably submitted the instruction several weeks prior to the final pretrial conference, 
which was held on September 24, 2001. R. 252C. 
Even if defense counsel did not submit the instruction before the final pretrial 
conference, he properly requested the instruction during trial. Contrary to the trial 
judge's ruling, Rule 19 does not limit parties to submitting proposed instructions prior to 
trial even if the judge so orders. Rather, that rule contemplates that trial judges may 
instruct the jury on the law "[djuring the course of the trial" to assist the jurors in 
comprehending the case or when a party "requests] an interim written instruction." Utah 
R. Crim. P. 19(b). Then, "[a]t the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file [a] written request that the court instruct the jury on 
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the law as set forth in the request" Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). After the trial judge decides 
which requested instructions to give to the jury, the parties must note any objections on 
the record "before the instructions are given to the jury" to give the trial judge an 
opportunity to correct any errors before the jury begins its deliberations. Utah R. Crim. P. 
19(d), (e); Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley Hospital 830 P.2d 270, 271-72 (Utah 1992). 
Based on the procedures announced in Rule 19, the trial judge erroneously 
concluded that defense counsel had requested the lesser offense instruction late. Rule 19 
specifically allows parties to request addition jury instructions after the pretrial 
conference and as late as "[a]t the close of the evidence...." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). In 
contrast to the trial judge's approach, that rule is not mandatory nor does it require that all 
instructions be submitted prior to trial if the trial judge so directs. Rather, the rule allows 
for flexibility and practicality, in apparent recognition that parties cannot anticipate all the 
instructions needed for any given trial. It also gives trial judges an opportunity to correct 
any errors before the jury begins deliberations. See State v. Radford* 793 P.2d 324, 325 
(Ore. Ct. App. 1990) (parties need only submit proposed jury instructions before closing 
statements). Defense counsel complied with these policies and requested the lesser 
offense instruction [a]t the close of the evidence" before the jury began its deliberations. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). 
Although Rule 19 allows trial judges to order parties to submit additional jury 
instructions "at such earlier time as the court reasonably directs," this authorization only 
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applies to orders given during the trial itself and does not apply to orders prior to trial. Id. 
(emphasis added). In this case, the trial judge never ordered defense counsel during trial 
to submit proposed defense instructions before the close of the evidence. In fact, at the 
beginning of the lunch break, the trial judge stated that he would conduct a hearing on the 
jury instructions following the break: 
I don't think we should need a lot of discussion. What I'll do is 
go ahead and put [the jury instructions] together the way I 
propose to give them over the noon hour and those will be 
sitting on your desk when you get back and if you could find a 
moment to take a quick look at them and maybe just on the 
break we could have a discussion about that. 
R. 249: 43 (emphasis added). As this statement indicates, the trial judge affirmatively 
represented that the parties could submit additional instructions following the lunch 
break. 
Basic fairness supports allowing parties to offer instructions at the close of the 
evidence. As explained above, criminal defendants are entitled to instruct the jury on 
lesser offenses whenever two offenses overlap and "'any reasonable view of the evidence 
would support'" conviction for the lesser offense. Camith, 1999 UT 107, %6, 993 P.2d 
869. But, criminal defendants often do not know whether the evidence supports their 
theory on a lesser offense until the evidence is actually presented at trial. Under the trial 
judge's view, criminal defendants would always have to request a lesser offense 
instruction before trial to avoid waiving the requested instruction at the conclusion of the 
34 
evidence. This approach unfairly punishes criminal defendants for raising an alternate 
defense at trial and deprives them of the right to instruct the jury on their theory of the 
case. IdL; Baker. 671 P.2d at 159. 
Moreover, strategic reasons argue against requesting lesser offense instruction in 
advance. Defense counsel may not wish to tip off the prosecution on their trial strategy 
beforehand because doing so could weaken the defense by implicitly communicating to 
the prosecutor that the defendant admits some guilt. Prosecutors are not entitled to know 
the defense theory before trial. Rather, they bear the burden of proving guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, even on lesser offenses. Baker. 671 P.2d at 157. 
Rule 19 specifically rejects the trial judge's view that criminal defendants could 
only submit lesser offense instructions during trial if the evidence surprised them and they 
did not anticipate raising the defense prior to trial. R. 249: 98-99. That rule says nothing 
about limiting jury instructions submitted in the middle of trial to surprise issues. Instead, 
the rule contemplates that parties will submit additional jury instructions during the trial. 
As long as the lesser offense overlaps with the charged crime and the evidence rationally 
supports the requested instruction, Baker and its progeny require trial judges to instruct 
the jury on lesser offenses. 671 P.2d at 159. The trial judge's approach violates the 
"fundamental policy of permitting the jury to find a defendant guilty of any offense that 
fits the facts, rather than forcing it to elect between the charges the prosecutor chooses to 
file and an acquittal." Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. 
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B. The Trial Judge Abused His Discretion in 
Ruling that Defense Counsel Filed a Late 
Request Because the Trial Judge Misled 
Defense Counsel, the Practice in the District 
Court Allowed for the Request, Defense 
Counsel Acted in Good Faith, and the Law 
Required the Judge to Give the Instruction 
Even assuming the trial judge set a specific deadline for submitting proposed 
instructions during trial, he abused his discretion in rejecting the lesser offense 
instruction. Both court rules and case law grant the trial court discretion to excuse an 
untimely request for a jury instruction. Here, the trial judge represented that he had not 
finalized jury instructions and indicated that defense counsel could raise instructions after 
the lunch break. Defense counsel relied on these representations and then the trial judge 
unfairly punished him for it. In any event, the trial judge's misapplication of the law on 
lesser offenses constituted an abuse of discretion. 
Rule 19 provides that trial judges may "reasonably direct[]" parties when to submit 
additional instructions during the course of a trial. Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). Further, Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 12 provides that if a party fails to make a request "at the time set 
by the court," that party waives the request unless the trial judge "for cause shown . . . 
grant[s] relief from such waiver." Utah R. Crim. P. 12(d). These provisions grant trial 
judges discretion to excuse any late requests for jury instructions. See State v. Evans. 668 
P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983). 
Here, the trial judge failed to weigh the applicable concerns and he misapplied the 
36 
law on lesser offenses. At the very least, the record reveals that defense counsel and the 
trial judge miscommunicated over when to submit jury instructions. Even if defense 
counsel did not submit the proposed instruction in July 2001 as the record indicates, he 
reasonably relied on Rule 19 in submitting his instructions f,[a]t the close of the 
evidence." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). In the first place, the trial judge never set a deadline 
for submitting additional instructions during trial. If anything, the trial judge 
communicated to defense counsel that the judge would prepare his "propose[d]n 
instructions over the lunch break and then he would conduct f,a discussion about" the jury 
instructions with counsel. R. 249: 43. Given these representations that additional 
discussions were to follow, the trial judge abused his discretion in concluding that he set a 
firm deadline for submitting instructions before the lunch break. 
Second, defense counsel reasonably relied on the trial judge's representations 
based on his past practice with other judges. As defense counsel explained, in the 10 
years he has practiced law, no judge has ever denied a request for a lesser offense 
instruction when that instruction was submitted before the close of the evidence and the 
evidence supported the giving of the instruction. R. 250B: 2-3. Based on his extensive 
experience and understanding of the practice of every other judge in the district court, 
defense counsel reasonably believed that he could submit his requested instruction at the 
close of the evidence. Because defense counsel acted in good faith, the trial judge acted 
unreasonably in refusing to accept the instruction. 
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Third, defense counsel had no opportunity to submit the lesser offense instruction 
when the trial judge apparently wanted him to do so. After excusing the jury for lunch, 
the trial judge wanted counsel to meet with him for a conference on the jury instructions. 
R. 249: 42. The judge recognized, however, that defense counsel was unavailable 
because he had to teach a class over the lunch hour. R. 249: 42-43. The judge, 
accordingly, suggested that he prepare his proposed instructions and then hold a 
conference on them after counsel had an opportunity to review them following lunch. R. 
249: 43. When the time came to hold the conference, the trial judge blamed defense 
counsel for failing to submit the lesser offense instruction before lunch even though the 
trial judge knew defense counsel's busy lunch schedule and he had indicated that he 
would hold a conference after the noon break. The trial judge abused his discretion in 
punishing defense counsel for being candid with the trial judge about his schedule and in 
relying on the judge's own representations that the judge would conduct a conference on 
the instructions after defense counsel taught his class. 
Fourth, the trial judge abused his discretion in misconstruing the law on lesser 
offense instructions. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge bases his or her 
judgment on "a misperception of the law." Walker v. Union Pacific R. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 
343 (Utah Ct App. 1992). Thus, in State v. Hammond. 2001 UT 92, If 18, 34 P.3d 773, 
the Utah Supreme Court remanded a case for resentencing because the trial judge abused 
his discretion in denying the defendant probation based on the judge's "misperception of 
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the import of the law." Likewise, as explained above, the trial judge misapplied the law 
on lesser offenses and ruled that receiving stolen property did not overlap with burglary 
and that the evidence did not support a conviction for the lesser crime. Because the trial 
judge misperceived the law, he abused his discretion in refusing to instruct the jury on 
receiving stolen property. Id 
The prosecutor protested below that the trial judge properly rejected the instruction 
because he had no opportunity to establish the value of the stolen property as required 
under the receiving stolen property statute. R. 249: 97. Contrary to this claim, Ms. 
Rodriguez testified that she purchased both the VCR and portable stereo for $200 each 
and that she bought one a month before the crime and the other a year previously. R. 249: 
17-18. Even if this testimony were not sufficient to establish value, the trial judge could 
have re-opened the State's case and allowed the prosecutor to present evidence of value. 
This case is distinguishable from two other cases in which counsel failed to request 
jury instructions. In State v. Evans. 668 P.2d 566, 567 (Utah 1983), the trial judge 
announced at the close of the evidence that he would recess the trial for the lunch break 
until 2:00 p.m. The judge further informed the parties that he would prepare the 
instructions over the break and instruct the jury upon reconvening. IdL Defense counsel 
remained silent. Id. 
When the trial judge reconvened the trial and started to instruct the jury, defense 
counsel submitted several jury instructions including an instruction on a lesser offense. 
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Id. The trial judge refused to consider the instructions because defense counsel gave no 
indication that he planned to request additional instructions before the lunch break. Id at 
567-68. The Utah Supreme Court ruled that defense counsel failed to preserve this issue 
for appeal. Id at 568. The Court ruled that defense "counsel's failure to notify the court 
that he wished to submit requested instructions knowing that the court would be preparing 
them during the recess" constituted the same as not requesting any instructions at all. Id. 
(emphasis added). 
In contrast, defense counsel below specifically preserved the denial of the lesser 
offense instruction for appeal by following the procedures set forth in Rule 19 and then 
following up that request with a motion for new trial. To preserve an issue, a party need 
only raise an issue to give the trial judge an "opportunity" to correct a mistake. State v. 
CallihanL 2002 UT 86, f62, 55 P.3d 573. By thoroughly arguing the necessity of the 
lesser offense instruction at trial and then filing a motion for new trial, defense counsel 
gave the trial judge multiple opportunities to correct the refusal to give the requested 
instruction. 
Additionally, contrary to Evans, the trial judge in this case never indicated that he 
planned to instruct the jury immediately after the lunch recess or that the time for 
requesting additional instructions had passed. Rather, the lunch break occurred during the 
middle of the State's case when additional evidence was yet to be presented from both 
parties. More importantly, rather than defense counsel misleading the trial judge by 
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remaining silent as occurred in Evans, the trial judge specifically represented that he 
would hold a "discussion" on jury instructions after the break and that he would prepare 
"propose[d]" rather than final instructions. R. 249: 43. Thus, the trial judge misled 
defense counsel rather than defense counsel remaining silent when he should have spoken 
as occurred in Evans. 668 P.2d at 567-68. 
Moreover, defense counsel's good faith belief that he could offer instructions after 
the break distinguishes this case from Evans. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned in that 
case that counsel remained silent "knowing" that the trial judge was preparing final 
instructions to read to the jury immediately following the break. Here, defense counsel 
believed, based on his considerable experience and the prevailing court practice and 
procedure, that he could submit instructions at the close of the evidence. He also had a 
legitimate basis for not preparing any instructions over the lunch break because of his 
teaching duties. Thus, this case presents no concern for attorney neglect as opposed to 
Evans. 
Likewise, the only other Utah case to rely on Evans has no application to this case. 
In Schwartz v. Benzow. 2000 UT App 203 (memorandum decision), the trial judge 
ordered the parties to submit their proposed jury instructions on October 20, 1998. 
Addendum B. The Appellant did not comply with this order and failed to submit any 
instructions until November 18, 1999. Id at 1. This Court applied the holding in Evans 
and ruled that the Appellant had waived any challenge to the rejection of the instructions. 
41 
Id, 
In addition to specifically preserving this issue, defense counsel here did not 
specifically disregard a court order as took place in Schwartz. Rather, the record 
indicates that he submitted the instruction several months before trial. Even if counsel 
had waited until trial to present his instruction, this case does not involve a complete 
disregard for a court order as occurred in Schwartz. Rather, defense counsel acted in 
good faith and believed he was following the proper procedures for requesting a lesser 
offense instruction as outlined in Rule 19. Further, this case presents a compelling case 
for giving the instruction because John had a right to instruct the jury on his theory that he 
was not involved in the burglary but that he knowingly or recklessly accepted stolen 
property. Hansen, 734 P.2d at 424. In any event, as explained above, the trial judge 
abused his discretion in refusing the requested instruction. 
Finally, even assuming defense counsel failed to timely request the lesser offense 
instruction, Rule 19 allows this Court to review the failure to give a jury instruction "to 
avoid manifest injustice." Utah R. Grim. P. 19(e); see also Evans. 668 P.2d 568 
(reviewing failure to give lesser offense instruction for manifest injustice). "Manifest 
injustice requires that the error be 'obvious' and 'be of sufficient magnitude that it affects 
the substantial rights of a party.'" State v. Casev. 2001 UT App 205, f26, 29 P.3d 25 
(quoting State v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221, 1227 (Utah 1998). Usually, a manifest 
injustice equates to plain error. State v. Powell 872 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1994). As 
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demonstrated previously, the trial judge plainly erred in refusing to give the jury the 
option of convicting John based on the facts rather than what the prosecutor opted to 
charge. Hansen. 734 P.2d at 424. Thus, this Court must reverse John's conviction to 
preserve his substantial right to instruct the jury on his theory of the case. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial judge erroneously failed to instruct the jury on a lesser related 
offense, John requests this Court to reverse his conviction and grant him a new trial. 
Dated this j | ^ day of January, 2003. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN MICHAEL HASSLEBLAD, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Prison 
PRESENT 
C l e r k : j i l l e n e w 
P r o s e c u t o r : LEMCKE, HOWARD R 
Defendan t 
Defendant's Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 29, 1982 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 11:17 
CHARGES 
1. BURGLARY - 2nd Degree Felony 
- Disposition: 10/04/2001 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
1V1_L IN Ul-CiO 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 001918195 FS 
Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN 
Date: Februarv 4, 2002 
Page 1 
Case No: 001918195 
Date: Feb 04, 2002 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of BURGLARY a 2nd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LEGAL DEFENDERS 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Salt Lake County Jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
Law Enforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Violate no laws. 
Full time employment. 
Complete GED. 
Page 2 
Case No: 001918195 
Date: Feb 04, 2002 
Early release to an inpatient treatment thru Odyssy House, 
Dated this day of , 20 . 
ANTHONY B. QUINN 
District Court Judge 
Page 3 (last) 
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2000 UT App 203 
(Cite as: 2000 WL 33250573 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Rae Lyn SCHWARTZ, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
David BENZOW, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 990328-CA. 
June 29, 2000. 
James W. Jensen. Cedar City, and Bruce H. Nagel 
and Andrew R. Bronsnick, Livingston, NJ, for 
appellant. 
Karra J. Porter, Salt Lake City, for appellee. 
Before GREENWOOD. BILLINGS, and ORME. JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
GREENWOOD. 
*1 Rae Lyn Schwartz appeals from a jury verdict 
finding both parties fifty percent at fault, resulting in 
a judgment for defendant, David Benzow. 
Specifically, Schwartz appeals three rulings by the 
trial court: (1) failure to grant a new trial because of 
an inconsistent jury verdict, (2) admission of hearsay 
evidence at trial, and (3) reftisal to give a requested 
jury instruction. We affirm. 
Schwartz argues that she is entitled to a new trial 
because the jury verdict was inconsistent. Schwartz 
first objected to the inconsistent verdict 
approximately two months after the jury rendered its 
verdict, in a motion for a new trial, which the trial 
court subsequently denied. The "failure to object to a 
verdict, informal or insufficient on its face, before the 
jury is discharged, constitutes a waiver of that 
objection." Ute-Cal Land Dev. Corp. v. Sather. 605 
P.2d 1240. 1247 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted). 
M[C]ounsel has the obligation not only to object to the 
form of the verdict, but to affirmatively seek to 
examine it." Martineau v. Anderson. 636 P.2d 1039, 
1043 (Utah 198R Because Schwartz failed to raise 
concerns about the inconsistency of the jury verdict 
until more than two months after the jury was 
discharged, Schwartz waived any challenge to the 
jury verdict. 
Next, Schwartz argues that admission of hearsay 
testimony at trial was prejudicial error. We review 
evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion; 
however, " ' M[a]n erroneous decision to admit or 
exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error 
unless the error is harmful." ' " State v. Jaeger. 1999 
UT 1. I] 30, 973 P.2d 404 (alteration in original) 
(citations omitted). Schwartz objects to the police 
officer's testimony that one biker told him that she 
did not recall a jeep passing by at all and that a 
second biker told him that the jeep was fifteen feet 
past Schwartz when the crash occurred. However, a 
third biker, Jeffery Branigan, who was Schwartz's 
witness, directly testified that he saw the jeep crowd 
and honk at the bikers but did not see the jeep make 
contact with Schwartz's bike. Both hearsay 
statements, admitted through the police officer's 
testimony, are entirely consistent with the core of 
Branigan's testimony, namely that he did not see 
contact between the jeep and Schwartz's bike. 
Therefore, if the admission of the hearsay statements 
was error, the error was harmless and not reversible. 
Finally, Schwartz claims that it was prejudicial for 
the trial judge to deny her request for a jury 
instruction about the illegality of driving across a 
double yellow line. "We review a judge's refusal to 
give a jury instruction for correctness, as it is a 
question of law." Robinson v. All-Star Delivery. Inc.. 
1999 UT 109, f 9. 992 P.2d 969. Schwartz's failure 
to notify the court that she wished to submit jury 
instructions by the court's specified deadline "carries 
with it the same consequence of failing to submit 
them at all." State v. Evans. 668 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 
1983). A pretrial order specified that the last day to 
submit jury instructions was October 20, 1998. The 
jury instruction under appeal was not filed until 
November 18, 1999. Therefore, by submitting the 
jury instruction to the court after the deadline, 
Schwartz waived any challenge to the trial judge's 
refusal to give the instruction. Furthermore, we fail to 
see how the instruction would have benefitted 
Schwartz, since under the circumstances of this case, 
breaking the law by crossing the double yellow line 
mitigates against Benzow's negligence in that if he 
did so, it would only have helped him to avoid the 
bikers. 
*2 Schwartz's objection to the inconsistent jury 
verdict, as well as her request for the jury instruction 
were not timely, and therefore, Schwartz waived 
these issues. Also, if the admission of the hearsay 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Not Reported in P.2d 
2000 UT App 203 
(Cite as: 2000 WL 33250573 (Utah App.)) 
testimony at trial was error, the error was harmless. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
BILLINGS and ORME. JJ., concur. 
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